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ABSTRACT 
The Brazilian Coffee Agribusiness system has been modified over the last years. An evidence is the outsourcing 
contracts in agricultural mechanization of harvesting services. Brazilian coffee growers have replaced their own 
machineries for specialized services firms. The Coase (1937)'s make or buy paradigm sheds light the decision of 
farmers of the coffee chain with the investment lens. The investigation analyzes the determinants of 
outsourcing contracts in the transaction of harvesting mechanization in the agribusiness system of coffee in 
Brazil based on a quantitative approach through a probit regression with 105 Brazilian coffee growers’ 
interviews. The results validated the path dependence aspect and the hypothesis of the asset specificity and 
uncertainty of the efficient alignment argument of the Transaction Cost Economics, pointing out the high level 
of education of the farmer and the adoption of contracts as a way of coordinating other transactions as 
determinants of the outsourcing contracts of the transaction of harvesting mechanization. The study brought a 
change in coffee grower’s profile to a modern pattern of decision-making with three different institutional 
arrangements for the transaction of harvesting mechanization: total vertical integration, tapped vertical 
integration and outsourcing contracts or only outsourcing contracts.  
Keywords: outsourcing contracts; governance; harvesting mechanization; coffee crop; Brazil. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Brazilian Coffee Agribusiness system has been modified over the last years. Economic 
organization and strategies are not the same due to the modernization of production processes in the 
agriculture. An evidence is the outsourcing contracts of agricultural mechanization of harvesting services (Yang, 
Huang, Zhang, Reardon, 2013; Houssou, Diao, Cossar, Kolavalli, & Jimah, Aboagye, 2013). The same 
phenomenon is present in the coffee agribusiness system of Brazil
1
; Brazilian coffee growers have replaced 
their own machineries for specialized services firms. The Coase (1937)'s make or buy paradigm sheds light the 
decision of farmers of the coffee chain with the investment lens. The decision behind of the transaction 
between machinery industry and coffee growers involves direct impacts on the farmer's economic 
performance such as coffee quality. Therefore the present paper focuses on the following question: what are 
                                                          
1
 Brazil has two different species of coffee, but the present study analyses only the Coffea arabica due to 
economic relevance. This specie was responsible for about 30 million of bags of coffee and 4.7 billions of reais 
in 2016 while the Coffea canephora represented 580 thousands of bags and 67 millions of reais (CECAFE, 2016). 
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the determinants of outsourcing contracts of harvesting mechanization services in the Brazilian coffee 
agribusiness system? 
The choice of coffee production as a research agenda lies in the economic relevance of the activity in 
Brazil. The country is the world leader in the production and export of the grain. Brazilian production is 
responsible for about 50 million bags of coffee per year, representing about the twice of production of the 
second largest producer, Vietnam. Moreover, the production generated about 4.7 billion reais of exportations 
in 2016 (Conselho dos Exportadores de Café do Brasil [CECAFE], 2016).  
Regarding the decision of the literature, two arguments are presented. First, there is the emergence 
of a new institutional arrangement that focuses attention on the paradigm of make or buy of the modern 
agricultural firm, given the limitation of the scale economies as the exclusive factor in the decision of this 
transaction. The research is based on the theoretical framework of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to analyze 
the outsourcing contracts of harvesting mechanization with the efficient alignment hypothesis proposed by 
Williamson (1985),  contributing to the literature of agricultural contracts, which is limited (Allen & Lueck, 
2002).  
Secondly, the focus on the transaction of harvesting mechanization is because the activity is directly 
related with the coffee quality and with the economic performance of the farmer (Silva, Salvador, Padua & 
Queiroz, 2001). Brazilian farmers are using different institutional arrangements to coordinate the transaction of 
harvesting mechanization. According to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, 2006), about 
485 thousand rural farms are using outsourcing contracts in harvesting mechanization services, representing 
27,1% of all coordination mechanism. On the other hand, the mechanization by own machineries is used by 
approximately 1.5 million rural farms, representing 52.3% of the total
2
.  
The transaction between machinery industry and coffee growers has been coordinated by 
outsourcing contracts recently (Ministério Público do Trabalho [MPT], 2005), as well as the cases in soybean 
and sugarcane crops (Mascarin, 2014). This institutional arrangement excludes the need for investments to 
purchase own machineries and brings other relevant factors to the arena. However, these factors that affect 
the producers' choice are poorly understood, which raises other contribution of the paper in the aim of 
analyzing the determinants of the choice of outsourcing contracts in the transaction of harvesting 
mechanization of the Brazilian coffee agribusiness system. 
 The paper has four sections, besides this introduction. Section 2 presents the literature of 
agricultural mechanization in the international and Brazilian scenarios focusing in the transaction of harvesting 
mechanization in the coffee production with the Transaction Costs Economics approach. Section 3 outlines 
methodological procedures. Section 4 brings the results. Section 5 shows the final considerations and 
limitations. 
2. Agricultural mechanization literature 
2.1 Harvesting mechanization around the world 
The relevance of agricultural mechanization might be related with the cost in the production factor 
of "labor". According to Calvin and Martin (2012), labor cost represents 42% of the cost structure of a farm, as 
the case of the harvest of fruits and vegetables produced in the United States. 
Takeshima, Nin-Pratt & Diao (2013) argues that mechanization is critical when high labor costs have 
negative effects on agricultural productivity and the welfare of farmer. Although the international literature 
presents some obstacles to adoption of harvesting mechanization. There are cases that the vertical integration 
faces constraints such as the size of the farm (Igata, Hendriksen & Heijamn, 2008; Tiepo, 2015) and government 
subsidy credit (Hossou et al., 2013). 
Otherwise the use of the vertical disintegration is emerging to overcome those difficulties. The 
externalization of the harvesting mechanization is occurring in developed (Navarro, 2002, Igata, Hendriksen & 
Heijamn, 2008, Fisher & Knutson, 2013, Takeshima, Nin-Pratt & Diao, 2013) or underdeveloped economies 
(Hossou et al 2013, Yang et al., 2013, Chaddad, 2014 and Tiepo, 2015). 
Yang et. al. (2013) argues that the outsourcing of mechanization began due to incapacity of 
investments in fixed assets and the increasing in the rural worker's salary in 2004 in China. Since then some 
                                                          
2
 IBGE (2006) does not segregate the level by farmers, it only analyzes the level by farms, which might be carry 
some bias because a farmer might has more than one farm. Unfortynately this segregated data about Brazil 
does not exist.  
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Chinese farmers adopted the outsourcing governance and brought the issue of the site asset specificity, 
because the machinery transportation in Chinese provinces might result in high costs according to the distance 
between the agents, and also could damage the equipment. 
Hossou et. al. (2013) emphasizes the time and location as influencing factors in mechanization 
services in Ghana. The temporal aspect relates to the specific month to crop an agricultural product due to the 
influence of weather and rains. The use of machinery occurs in the months of June and July in northern Ghana, 
while in the south it appears from April to June and from September to October, in other words, it is possible to 
argue that delays in harvesting might damage the current or the next crop. The location factor is similar to 
China. The service providers increase their payments according to the distance. 
Takeshima, Nin-Pratt and Diao (2013) argue about the location in Africa, specifically in harvesting 
mechanization services in Nigeria. In the South there are farmers with a large structure of investments in their 
own machineries. While in North the outsourcing contracts rise to complement the workforce structure of 
mechanization as an additional resource. 
Fisher and Knutson (2013) argue that the human capital as another piece of the puzzle. Training and 
experience of the driver interfere in the governance decision. They demonstrate the higher the knowledge 
requirement the higher is the adoption of mechanization services in the harvest activity in some crops of the 
US agriculture. 
Igata, Hendriksen and Heijamn (2008) point out that the impact variables in the decision of 
outsource the mechanization in the Netherlands and Japan are: farm size and investments in own machineries. 
Size demonstrates that small farmers are able to acquire the technology only with external services. While the 
ownership of own machines indicates low seeking of services through external contracts. 
The Spain brings the case of the farmer's family and his traditions influencing the choice in the 
institutional arrangement to the mechanization transaction (Navarro, 2002). The traditionalism in agriculture 
production takes the closeness of the farmer's transactions interfering in the use of own machineries. The 
Spanish farmers have adopted the vertical integration of the transaction of mechanized harvesting over the 
years when they already use it as their governance mechanism in past decisions. 
2.2 Harvesting mechanization in Brazil 
The analysis of the governance choice focused on the harvesting mechanization in agricultural 
literature in Brazil looks mainly on extensive crops such as forestry and soybean crop. 
Canto et. al. (2006) shows that the determinants of outsourcing contracts in the forestry harvesting 
service are: financial incapacity to acquire machineries and equipments, lack of technical knowledge of the 
farmer and the work time to act exclusively in the forestry activity. 
Morais Filho (2006) also analyses the Brazilian forestry sector, where some cases present low 
specialization as well as some service providers without basic technical knowledge. 
Morais (2012) emphasizes the concerning in the delays in the activities of forestry production, 
especially in the harvest stage, whose allow the losses in value due to the delay of service providers. Novais and 
Romero (2009) also argue about the possibility of productive inefficiency due to delays in harvesting operation, 
in addition to pointing out that outsourcing is adopted to reduce investments in fixed assets. The last is 
reinforced by Zanchet (2009), who pinpoints that farmers do not use external contracts when they have their 
own machineries.   
According to Laurenti (2004), the use of third parties in agricultural services has been increased as a 
consequence of the creation of the Brazilian labor bill number 4330/2004. The author claims that Brazilian rural 
producers are adopting external contracts in order to reduce the risks of legal conflicts of labor. Indeed the 
labor regulation proposed in the bill was modified in 2015 and the farmers began to have liability in cases of 
legal problems. That is, not only the service provider, but the farmer also became responsible for carrying out 
those obligations.
3
 
It is possible to see the overlapping in the international and Brazilian scenarios. The timing aspects of 
the provision of the service, the need of specialized workforce, among other factors, are also relevant for the 
Brazilian farmers however some new points emerged such as the labor law conflicts. Therefore, based on the 
evidence from the different countries and agricultural crops, it is possible to observe the fit of the Transaction 
                                                          
3
 The institutional environment regarding the outsourcing of activities is changing. Brazilian labor law has 
divergening in different court's decisions on this point. There are conflicts between the norms of the current 
law number 331 of the Superior Labor Court (TST, 2011) and the Bill 4330/2004 (Brazil, 2004). Thus, that 
uncertainty emerges as a relevant point to be considered in our analysis. 
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Cost Economics to analyze the transaction of harvesting mechanization in the Brazilian coffee chain. The next 
section raises the relevant points in that governance decision based on this theoretical framework. 
2.3 Outsourcing contracts in harvesting mechanization through the TCE's lens 
The harvesting mechanization services extended the coordination to the outsourcing contracts as 
other institutional arrangement. The change allowed the use of external contracts as a new form of 
coordination and, consequently, raised the conflicts in contractual relations such as hold-up problems (Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, 1978, Williamson, 1985). Economic efficiency is associated with coordination issues - asset 
specificity and other characteristics of the transaction (uncertainty and path dependence), rising the main 
questioning of firm theory, the vertical integration dilemma (Coase, 1937). 
Verticalization emerges to economize the risks of appropriating quasi-rents from specialized assets 
(Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978). Asset specificity is associated with specific investments that might lost value 
when applied in an alternative use (Williamson, 1981), its levels are idiossincratics, intermediarie level of 
specialization and with no specific application. The transaction of harvesting mechanization in coffee is 
surrounded by the specificity of assets of different natures, uncertainty and path dependence. The allocation of 
resources in that transaction - whether for the purchase or outsourcing contracts - is directly associated with: 
decisions made in the past (family and farmer’s tradition), farmer’s profile (location and education level), 
training investments and experience of the driver of the machinery, structure of the farm (size and investments 
in specialized assets), and the timing to an efficient harvesting. 
The human capital specificity rises as the knowledge to operate the coffee harvester. For instance, 
driving specialization requires investments in training and accumulation of knowledge through the driver's 
experience to provide an efficient service. The allocation of resources for driver training or experience over 
time increases specialized knowledge, that is, the specificity of the transaction (Lyons, 1994; Williamson, 1985, 
1996). 
The site asset specificity is related to the distance between the farmer and the service provider 
(Caleman & Zylbersztajn, 2012; Williamson, 1985, 1996; Miele & Zylbersztajn, 2005). The transporting costs are 
high, so the farther the farmer, the higher are the investments to transport the harvesters. Besides that firms 
of harvesting mechanization services for coffee crop are concentrated in certain regions, which stresses their 
distance from the coffee grower as a relevant factor.   
The physical asset specificity is associated with the investments in specific equipments for coffee 
harvesting (Joskow, 1987; Lyons, 1994; Williamson, 1985; 1996). The capital structure in harvesters 
characterizes the degree of specialization of the farmer.  
The time asset specificity is also present in the coffee harvesting activity. The delay in carrying out 
this operation might cause losses to the farmer due to the quality in agricultural products. Days of delay to 
harvest coffee may result in a substantial loss in the quality of the grain. Thus, time specificity arises in 
situations of sensitivity in the delays of harvesting as the coffee crop demonstrates (Masten, 2000; Williamson, 
1985,1996). 
Different types of asset specificities influence the transaction of mechanized harvesting in coffee 
crop. A transaction with high asset specificity, there are higher quasi-rents, which induces strict hierarchical 
coordination (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985, 1996), in other words, the use of own 
machineries in the case of coffee production. This association is present in the transaction of harvesting 
mechanization in the coffee crop and builds the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: The higher the asset specificity, the lower the adoption of outsourcing contracts as the 
governance form in the transaction of harvesting mechanization in the Brazilian coffee production. 
 
The uncertainty is exposed by the inability to predict an event, or rather, the lack of knowledge 
about the probability distribution function of the phenomenon (Williamson, 1985, 1996). This attribute is 
present in agribusiness systems through the institutional environment (Zylbersztajn, 1996). 
Formal institutions are able to decrease or increase the level of uncertainty in transactions 
(Williamson, 1985; North, 1990), because their agents have limitations due to bounded rationality (Simon, 
1955). Then the uncertainty is surrounded by the court's ability to hold, process, and analyze the information. 
In addition to this assumption also raises the difficulty of measurement of contracts as potential factors in the 
increasing of uncertainty in a given environment (Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, 2007). 
Mascarin (2014) shows divergences in Brazilian labor law in the use of outsourcing contracts of 
agricultural equipment services. The author points out the uncertainty in that institutional environment, 
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because there is not a pattern of decisions regarding the prohibition or not of outsourcing contracts in 
harvesting mechanization services. The instability is a consequence of ongoing changes in the law that deals 
with the outsourcing of activities. Some court decisions are in favor of outsourcing contracts, while in others 
the subcontracting of mechanization services by the farmers is considered illegal and punishable.  
The complexity behind a contractual analysis and the lack of standardization in decision-making in 
the courts brings uncertainty to the harvesting mechanization transaction in the Brazilian coffee crop. Ceteris 
paribus, the option with lower transaction costs is the less formal institutional arrangement such as market 
relationships (Williamson, 1996). Therefore, considering the uncertainty attribute, the vertical integration 
occurs in environments with high uncertainties, that is, the coffee grower is just limited in the using of 
outsourcing contracts when he faces a scenario this feature. Based on it, the second hypothesis is the 
following: 
 
H2: The higher the uncertainty, the lower the adoption of outsourcing contracts as the governance 
form in the transaction of harvesting mechanization in the Brazilian coffee production. 
 
The past experiences also interfere in the choice of the institutional arrangement of the transaction 
of harvesting mechanization in the coffee farmer. Decision-making over time builds a path dependence that 
limits future negotiation options due to past choices. The concept emphasizes that previous relationships might 
influence the future on the basis of losses in the act of breaking that path dependence. The equilibrium 
between the benefits of continuing to adopt the structure already used in the past and the costs of entering a 
new path highlights the impossibility of change (North, 1990). 
Path dependence might limit the rational choices of economic agents. This attribute brings the 
influence between short and long term decisions. An example may be the exacerbated allocation of resources 
in a specialized activity, which can not be ignored due to their specific investments. However, even with such a 
limitation in choices, reality is based on a non-ergodic world (North, 1990), that is, the economic system is not 
stationary and decisions change drastically depending on the functioning of the market. 
This scenario applies to the present study. Specific investments in harvesters made in the past may 
limit the possibility of outsourcing in the present. This limitation is the result of situations in which producers 
who borrowed financial resources and allocated them in specific resources, for example. This coffee grower has 
restrictions in decision making because he might gets debts over the years. Thus, this type of coffee grower will 
hardly outsource and pay for the hours of service provided, since he already has his own machinery and debts. 
The application of path dependence in this transaction is assumed by the coffee grower's experience 
in the activity. The years in the coffee-growing activity and the knowledge transmitted by the family 
generations might influence the decision to use outsourcing contracts due to previous investments. The history 
of Brazilian coffee production shows that the transaction of harvesting mechanization has been vertically 
integrated since its origin (Silva et. al., 2001). The long-term contact with the activity implies in the tradition of 
use of own machineries. The successor of a coffee grower who already owns the equipment may be influenced 
to maintain this practice also. Therefore, this factor brings the verticalization in this transaction, building the 
third and last hypothesis: 
 
H3: The higher the path dependence of the coffee grower, the lower the adoption of outsourcing 
contracts as the governance form in the transaction of harvesting mechanization in the Brazilian coffee 
production. 
3. Methodology 
The study has an exploratory, descriptive and quantitative approach. The exploratory aspect is used 
as a consequence of the emerging of service providers in harvesting mechanization and the use of outsourcing 
contracts to coordinate that transaction by the coffee growers. The model uses primary data collected through 
a survey based on the Transaction Cost Economics literature. 
The questionnaire was validated by two specialists in the coffee market during July and September in 
2015. A pre-test was carried out with a collection of 30 observations during the International Coffee Week in 
September 2015, a meeting with a diversity of profiles of Brazilian coffee growers. Further 39 observations 
were collected by telephone to verify the behavior of the coffee growers during the interviews. 
Then a final sample of 105 observations of coffee growers with mechanized harvesting (by his own 
structure or by outsourcing contracts) with non-probabilistic nature was built with personal interviews (55 
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observations) in two Brazilian conferences (FEMAGRI 2016 and SimCafé 2016) related to the object of study, 
and also the data collection by telephone (50 observations) used the database of associations and cooperatives 
of the coffee sector in Brazil. The data collection was carried out only with coffee farmers with mechanized 
harvest, either subcontracted or with their own machineries. The farmers interviewed are from the states of 
Minas Gerais and São Paulo because they are the two main regions of coffee production in Brazil and they have 
the variety of production structure found in other states. Thus, the questionnaires were answered by arabica 
coffee farmers who bring the different characteristics of high-quality coffee plantations and the mechanized 
harvesting processes found in the country. 
The analysis assumes that economic efficiency is based on Williamson's concept of efficient 
alignment (Williamson, 1985, 1996) and the literature on the subcontracting of agricultural mechanization. 
3.1 Metrics on the decision of mechanization outsourcing in coffee production 
The metrics are based on the literature of outsourcing of agricultural mechanization, using the 
theory of Transaction Cost Economics. The structure of this section is focused on the hypotheses: asset 
specificity, uncertainty, path dependence and control variables. The metrics are presented in Table 1 with their 
theoretical variables, types, the expected signal and the reference of similar use in the literature. 
 
Table 1 – Model’s variables. 
Variable Hypothesis Type Sign Reference 
Dependent 1 = outsourcing contracts of harvesting 
mechanization services, 
0 = use of own machineries and services 
(vertical integration) 
Dummy --- --- 
 
Human 
asset 
specificity 
(H1) 
The higher the need for driver’s experience, the 
higher is the using of own machineries and 
services. (dri_exp) 
Discrete 
(years) 
- Lyons (1994) and 
Williamson (1985, 
1996) 
The higher the relevance of driver’s training, 
the higher is the using of own machineries and 
services. (dri_train) 
Ordinal 
(Likert scale 
of 05 points) 
- Lyons (1994) and 
Williamson (1985, 
1996) 
 
 
 
Site asset 
specificity 
(H1) 
The presence of services provider in the farm’s 
region minimizes the site asset specificity and 
enables the outsourcing contracts of harvesting 
mechanization (pres_serv) 
 
Dummy 
(1=presence, 
 0 =absence) 
 
+ 
Caleman and 
Zylbersztajn (2012), 
Williamson (1985, 
1996) and Miele and 
Zylbersztajn (2005) 
The longer the distance between farmer and 
service provider, the higher is the site asset 
specificity and, consequently, the higher is the 
using of own machineries and service. 
(dist_serv) 
Continuous 
(kilometers) 
- Caleman and 
Zylbersztajn (2012), 
Williamson (1985, 
1996) and Miele and 
Zylbersztajn  (2005)  
 
Physical 
asset 
specificity 
(H1) 
The higher the investments in specific 
equipments to coffee harvesting, the higher is 
the physical asset specificity and, consequently, 
the higher is the using of own machineries and 
services. (log_investequip)  
Continuous 
 (Natural 
logarithm in 
reais) 
 
- 
Joskow (1987), Lyons 
(1994) and Williamson 
(1985, 1996)  
 
 
Time asset 
specificity 
(H1) 
The higher the perception of value losses due 
to delay in harvesting, the higher is the time 
asset specificity and, consequently, the higher 
is the using of own machineries and services. 
(delay_harvest) 
Ordinal 
(Likert scale 
of 05 points) 
- Masten (2000) and 
Williamson (1985, 
1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
The existence of “Termos de Ajustamento de 
Conduta” in farmer's region denotes barriers 
and institutional uncertainty, that is, implies in 
the using of own machineries and service. 
(pres_tac) 
 
Dummy 
(1=existence
, 
 0=absence) 
 
- 
Hermalin, Katz and 
Craswell (2007), 
Mascarin (2014) and 
North (1990)  
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Uncertainty 
(H2) 
The existence of labor lawsuit in farmer's farm 
denotes barriers and institutional uncertainty, 
that is, implies in the using of own machineries 
and services. (exist_lawsuit) 
 
Dummy 
(1=existence
, 
 0=absence) 
 
- 
Hermalin, Katz and 
Craswell (2007), 
Mascarin (2014) and 
North (1990),  
The contracting to other services denotes 
greater management ability to solve 
contractual conflicts, that is, implies in fewer 
uncertainty and the higher the use of 
outsourcing contracts in harvesting 
mechanization (other_contracts) 
Dummy 
(1=other 
contracrs, 0 
= otherwise) 
 
+ 
Hermalin, Katz and 
Craswell (2007) 
 
 
Path 
Dependenc
e (H3) 
The higher the famility tradition in coffee 
production implies in higher conservatism in 
farmer’s decision, consequently, the higher the 
the using of own machineries and services due 
to path dependence (fam_tradition) 
Dummy 
(≥ 3
rd
 
familiy’s 
generation 
=1) 
 
- 
 
 
North (1990) and Silva 
et. al. (2001) 
The longer the farmer’s activity in coffee 
production implies in higher conservatism in 
farmer’s decision, consequently, the higher the 
using of own machineries and services due to 
path dependence (farmer_experience) 
Discrete 
(years) 
-  
North (1990) and Silva 
et. al. (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
variables 
 
The higher the farmer’s education level, the 
greater management ability to solve 
contractual conflicts, that is, it might change 
the path dependence and the higher the use of 
outsourcing contracts (education) 
Dummy 
(≥ 
Undergradu
ate 
education 
level) 
 
+ 
 
 
--- 
Farm size could generate scale economies and 
minimize the costs of capital immobilization, 
that is, implies in the using of own machineries 
and services (hectares) 
Discrete 
(hectares) 
 
- 
 
--- 
The own workforce strucuture might influence 
in the amount of investiments in fixed assets 
such as manual or semmimechanized 
workforce implying in outsourcing contracts of 
harvesting mechanization. 
(workforce_structure) 
Ordinal 
(Likert scale 
of 03 points) 
 
+ 
 
--- 
The farmer’s ability to produce high-quality 
coffee grains presents greater caution in 
harvesting activity, that is, the higher the use of 
own machineries and services  (perc_gourmet) 
Continuous 
(% of 
premium 
coffee 
production) 
-  
--- 
Source: Author. 
 
Human capital asset specificity has two metrics: the need for driver's experience and the relevance 
of driver's training. The first observes the need in years of experience in driving harvesting machineries for 
coffee crop. The second is a scale of the relevance of training of the driver. Both metrics lay their reference on 
Lyons (1994)  Williamson (1985, 1996). In harvesting mechanization it is possible to analyze the specialization 
of the driver to maintain the optimum productive level. If the need of knowledge is higher, even experience 
over the years or technical training, the higher is the use of vertical integration to guarantee this accumulation 
of experiences over time, that is, the farmer does not have control to guarantee that the employee do not be 
fired in a private enterprise, which causes the losses in the accumulated knowledge of the human capital
4
. 
                                                          
4
 It is reasonable to expect and opposite results, but in this case there is a issue based on the efficiency of the 
service at a whole, for example, the quality of the harvesting process and the knowledge about the crop – 
which implies in caution in damages in the coffee trees and in the machineries. 
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Site asset specificity is associated with the location of the harvesting mechanization service provider. 
The first metric is a dummy variable that measure the existence or not of the service provider in the farmer's 
region. The second measures the distance in kilometers between the service provider and the farmer. The 
reference lies on Caleman and Zylbersztajn (2012), Miele and Zylbersztajn (2005 and Williamson (1985, 1996). 
The first two studies presents the distance between the agents involved in the transaction as an indicator to 
measure the investments of transportations as well as the site asset specificity involved. 
Physical asset specificity is associated with the investments in specific equipments for coffee 
harvesting. The metric is the natural logarithm of the investment (in reais) in own machineries, using the 
references on Joskow (1987), Lyons (1994) and Williamson (1985, 1996)’s works. The authors pointed out that 
the investments in specialized fixed assets denote specificity. 
Time asset specificity is analyzed by the possibility of losses due to delays in the harvesting process. 
The measurement is a five-point Likert-scale with increasing order in the perception of loss of the producer if 
there is a delay in the harvesting activity. The decision to adopt a scale is interconnected the ability of this type 
of variable to capture the interviewee's perception, because a more reliable variable, such as the number of 
days for the loss of value is difficult to be measured by the coffee grower himself. The reference is Masten 
(2000) and Williamson (1985, 1996). The first author affirms that agricultural products have time asset 
specificity because they are perishable. 
Uncertainty is analyzed as the difficulty of the institutional environment in interpreting complex 
forms of governance, using the references of Hermalin, Katz and Craswell (2007), Mascarin (2014) and North 
(1990). The metric observes the uncertainty in labor lawsuits and the coffee grower's competence to manage 
contractual conflicts. In the region where a coffee grower has faced a judicial process related to labor law, it is 
expected to observe the vertical integration of the harvesting mechanization transaction, because the agent 
tries to avoid other lawsuits called "Termos de Ajustamento de Conduta
5
". The metric of the existence of other 
contracts indicates the farmer's capability to manage contractual problems with service providers and with the 
courts. It is expected that: a) the indicators of the existence of Terms of Adjustment of Conduct and the 
existence of a labor judicial problem imply in the use of the own machineries and serves; and b) the use of 
contracting for other services implies in the outsourcing of harvesting mechanization services. 
Path dependence is measured using the farmer's family tradition and the time of experience in the 
activity of the farmer. Tradition is measured by a family's 3rd generation dummy metric in coffee production. 
The experience time is measured by the years of experience. The long period of coffee production limits the 
decision making possibilities. Past experiences build another path that may become more costly if you make a 
change in the pattern you have previously adopted. These aspects highlight the orientation towards vertical 
integration and it shows a limitation of change in the choices made in the past by the agent, that is, 
conservatism in the agricultural sector implies the closeness between the farmers and their transactions of 
fixed assets due to investments made in past decisions. The references are North (1990) and Silva et. al. (2001) 
The model also adopts control variables that solve possible interferences. The expectation of the 
educational level is the results favoring the outsourcing. The indicator aims to capture the change of tradition 
in the farmer's decision based on the path dependence due to the increasing in his technical knowledge in the 
management of his assets. Even though it is not a specific domain, education in general could increase their 
specialized capabilities such as the management of coffee grower transactions. Therefore the higher the 
educational level, the higher the use of outsourcing of harvesting mechanization services. The metric is a 
dummy variable that verifies the presence of the level of education equal or greater than the undergraduate 
level.
6
 
The number of hectares of coffee crop is used to analyze scale economies. Larger farms have greater 
capability to invest in fixed assets. Those coffee growers tend to use their own machinery because of the 
dilution of the fixed costs that the size of their crop provides. Thus the higher the hectares in coffee crop, the 
higher the use of own machineries and service.  
The own workforce structure influences positively the use of outsourcing of harvesting 
mechanization services. The metric is a three-points Likert scale with decreasing levels of mechanization using, 
                                                          
5
 Termos de Ajustamento de Contuda is a document ordering changes and fixing penalties after a investigation 
that found irregular conditions of production in Brazilian farms. The main issue of this kind of lawsuit is related 
with rural labor. 
6
   We chose the dummy variable because the use of the years of formal education was not feasible. Analyzing 
the answers of the years of study and the level of education, it was noticed that the respondents contradicted 
the pattern of years of education found in the Brazilian educational system. In this way, the continuous variable 
could bring spurious results. 
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that is, it originates from a mechanized structure to semi-mechanized to the manual level. The adoption of 
manual workforce will make the use of outsourcing of agricultural mechanization services cheaper than a 
mechanized one, in other words, this metric also captures the structure of investments in fixed assets. 
The control variable of the percentage of gourmet coffee production analyzes the influence of an 
upstream transaction in a downstream transaction. The ability to increase quality in the coffee carries the 
portrait of a producer with a greater knowledge of coffee production, as well as a competence in the 
management of the technical attributes of the crop and more caution in the harvesting activity (e.g. to regulate 
and to use the machinery to catch matures and high-quality fruits). The metric brings the profile of a high-
quality coffee grower implying in the use of own machineries and service. 
3.2 Econometric model 
It was used a probit regression which its theoretical presentation is shown in Equation 1 based on 
Green (2003). Probit regresion estimates the likelihood P (y = 1 | x) = ɸ (xit’ β), where ɸ represents the 
cumulative normal density function. 
Equation 1. Probit regression 
Уit
*
 =xit’ β + Ɛit, 
 
Where, 
,Уit = 1,  if Уit 
* 
≥ 0 
Уit = 0, if Уit 
* 
< 0 
The econometric model (Equation 2) lies in the background of its theoretical model (Equation 1) and 
also it uses the metrics presented in the last section (Table 1). The quantitative results were obtained from the 
STATA 12 software. 
 
 
Equação 2. Probit regression with TCE variables 
P(mechanization=1|x) = ɸ (β0 + β1 Х dri_exp  + β2 Х dri_train + β3 Х pres_serv + β4Х dist_serv + β5Х 
log_investequip + β 6 Х delay_harvest + β7Х pres_tac +  β8Х exist_lawsuit + β9 Х other_contracts + β10 Х 
fam_tradition + β11 Х farmer_experience + β12 Х education + β13 Х hectares +  β14 Х workforce_structure +  β15 Х 
perc_gourmet)  
 
Where, 
 
Mechanization [1= outsourcing of harvesting mechanization services, 0 = using own machineries and 
services] 
 
4. Results 
 
The results come from a survey with 105 questionnaires with Brazilian coffee growers between 
December (2015) and April (2016). The paper uses some assumptions: i) the decision of “make or buy” in the 
transaction of harvesting mechanization in coffee crop has influence of asset specificities, uncertainty and path 
dependence; ii) using the specific investments lens, there is the correlation between asset specificity and 
vertical integration; iii) uncertainty deals with contractual problems and labor lawsuits, which implies in vertical 
integration; iv) path dependence is observed through in farmer’s tradition in his decision-making process, even 
by himself or by his family’s tradtion in continue using the harvesting mechanization with own machineries and 
services. 
Firstly a probit regression model was performed to analyze the make or buy decision in the 
transaction of mechanized harvesting of the Brazilian coffee farmer. It was verified that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables and heteroscedasticity in residuals. However it was opted 
for the model with correction of robust errors.
7
 
                                                          
7
 The Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test was performed for the multicollinearity test (FIV <10) and the 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weiserg test for heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 2 shows a summary with descriptive statistics of the model’s variables. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of model’s variable 
Variable Obs Mean Standard-Deviation Min Max 
education 105 0,4285714 0,4972452 0 1 
hectares 105 0, 447619 0, 4996336 0 1 
workforce_structure 105 87,38095 185,1324 2 1160 
perc_gourmet 105 1,790476 0,8400462 1 3 
dri_exp 104 0,1480769 0,2445447 0 0,8 
dri_train 105 4,742857 0,5888152 2 5 
pres_serv 105 2.695238  1.754795 0 10 
dist_serv 105 0,7333333 0, 4443376 0 1 
log_investequip 104 50,24038 110,1837 0 600 
delay_harvest 105 10,06386 5,1721 0 15,89495 
pres_tac 105 3,780952 1,263245           1 5 
exist_lawsuit 104 0,2211538 0, 4170337 0 1 
other_contracts 103 0,1747573 0, 3816164 0 1 
fam_tradition 104 0,2692308 0, 4457081 0 1 
farmer_experience 105 0,3714286 0, 4855042 0 1 
education 105 23,75238  12,77225 2 60 
Source: Research data. 
 
Table 2 shows the results incrementally. Model A presents the findings with control variables. In the 
following models (B to D) there is the aggregation of the theoretical variables of asset specificity, uncertainty 
and path dependence. 
 
Table 2 - Models of probit regression with robust errors 
Dependent variable 
out_mec 
1 = outsourcing of harvesting mechanization services, 
0 = using own machineries and services (vertical integration) 
 Probit models with robust errors 
 A B C D 
education 0,860158*** 
(0,3269167) 
0,7697873* 
(0,4295236) 
1, 361012*** 
(0,4500213) 
1,877423 **** 
(0,5295506) 
hectares -0,0031283*** 
(0,0011108) 
-0,004091*** 
(0,0012699) 
-0,0049898**** 
(0,001371) 
-0,0053918**** 
(0,0014967) 
workforce_structure -0,9530112**** 
(0,1822731) 
-0,7929665*** 
(0,284833) 
-1,02925*** 
(0,3405358) 
- 1,151986*** 
(0,4311868) 
perc_gourmet -0,4115334
NS
 
(0,6120936) 
-0,4259199
NS 
(0,69683) 
-0,5971315
NS 
(0,7104125) 
- 1,279375* 
(0,7389933) 
dri_exp  0,2817679
NS 
(0,2893532) 
0,4567159
NS 
(0,3210895) 
0,3787929
NS
 
(0,3222173) 
dri_train  -0,5674558**** 
(0,1508671) 
-0,6501894**** 
(0,1761673) 
-0,8187704*** 
(0,2530336) 
pres_serv  -0,1422537
NS
 
(0,3737092) 
-0,3218772
 NS
 
(0,472818) 
-0,3534104
NS
 
(0,5463152) 
dist_serv  -0,0004335
NS
 
(0,0013595) 
-0,0003523
NS 
(0,0016648) 
-0,001436
NS
 
(0,0020574) 
log_investequip  0,2105818*** 
(0,0766268) 
0,2589756*** 
(0,0800915) 
0,3351083**** 
(0,0914593) 
delay_harvest  -0,2463278* 
(0,1434641) 
-0,3240412** 
(0,1611737) 
-0,3083747* 
(0,1867566) 
pres_tac   -0,9307705** 
(0,4168441) 
-1,330273*** 
(0,4977225) 
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exist_lawsuit   -0,1685882
NS
 
(0,6800922) 
0,5978889
NS
 
(0,82946) 
other_contracts   0,7275881
NS 
(0,55626) 
1,057064* 
(0,6202775) 
fam_tradition    -1,576367*** 
(0,4934657) 
farmer_experience    -0,0157878
NS
 
(0,0184781) 
Constant 1,3736**** 
(0,3936778) 
-0,0722283
NS
 
(1,578245) 
-0,5944175
 NS
 
(1,651) 
0,1785578
NS
 
(1,713184) 
Nº observations 104 103 101 101 
Log-likehood -51,525911  - 36,037203 - 32,27187 -27,474126 
LR-chi2 33,66 32,13 37,04 34,79 
Prob>chi2  0,0000  0,0004  0,0004 0,0026 
Pseud-R2 0,2757 0,4894 0,5350 0,6042 
NS not significant, *p<0,1, **p<0,05, ***p<0,01, ****p<0,001 
Source: Research data 
 
Model D was chosen. In this model, the variables tested are related to all hypotheses and to the 
research problem. The previous models only had the objective to show the interaction of theoretical variables. 
The model D presented good estimates according to its structure: i) log-likehood of -27.40; Ii) Likehood ratio 
(LR) chi-square with 14 degrees of freedom equal to 34.97; (Iii) probability of chi-square equal to 0.0025. 
Considering the lowest level of significance, all hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) were validated with a 
level of 0.1%, 1% and 1%, respectively. Within the group of each hypothesis it was possible to observe the 
levels of significance of 0.1%, 1% and 10% for H1; 1% and 10% for H2; 1% for H3; and 0.1%, 1% and 10% for the 
control variables. 
It was observed that the variables with 0.1% significance (p <0.001) were: EDUCATION, HECTARES 
and LOG_INVESTEQUIP. At 1% significance (p <0.01) emerged: WORKFORCE_STRUCTURE, DRI_EXP, PRES_TAC 
and FAM_TRADITION. At 10% significance (p <0.1) the variables PERC_GOURMET, DELAY_HARVEST and 
OTHER_CONTRACTS were obtained. The variables that did not present significance were: DRI_TRAIN, 
PRES_SERV, DIST_SERV, EXIST_LAWSUIT and FARMER_EXPERIENCE. 
About Hypothesis 1 (H1) it is possible to observe that the variables DRI_EXP (p <0.01) and 
DELAY_HARVEST (p <0,1)  affect negatively the outsourcing governance and tend to vertical integration as 
expected, that is, the higher the asset specificity involved in the transaction of mechanized harvesting, the 
higher is the tendency to adopt own machineries in coffee harvesting mechanization (vertical integration). The 
variables that represent the asset specificity in that transaction were human capital (years of experience of the 
driver) and time (losses due to delay in coffee harvesting). 
The variable LOG_VAL_MAQPPROP showed opposite sign than expected, but significant. Possibly, 
this result is related to the fact that the interviewees considered the investments in general, not only those 
specific to the coffee harvester. The argument is based on the variable PERC_GOURMET, that is, the coffee 
farmer who outsources may lose quality of production due to the carelessness the service providers in the 
harvest of good (i.e mature) coffee. Therefore farmer who uses outsourcing contracts seek another means of 
increasing the quality of still immature fruits, such as investments in post-harvest equipment, which can reach 
values as high as investments in harvesting machinery. 
The result of DRI_TRAIN was opposite to expected and not significantIt is suggested that incentives 
of the service provider to keep the human capital is such high as to the coffee growers’ incentives. The concern 
with the losses caused by the inefficient operation of the machineries and the attempt to avoid damage to the 
crop is intertwined with the experience of the driver. The efficient operation carries better results for both - 
firm and farmer. The result of the DRI_EXP variable corroborates this argument. The tacit knowledge of the 
driver who carries the solution of the coffee grower's desires, because the employee will be able to minimize 
such losses according to the greater knowledge of the coffee plantation in which he is operating (eg tree height 
or distance between trees). 
The variables PRES_SERV and DIST_SERV presented the expected signal, but they were not 
significant. The finding suggests that both factors might not interfere in the make or buy decision of transaction 
of mechanized harvesting, because there is a strategy of amplification of service area of the service providers 
throughout the Brazilian territory. Specialized firms began to move in the coffee producing regions during the 
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harvest period, as well as in the case of soy and sugar cane. In this way, the transportation investments of the 
machines are now compensated by the volumes of operation, as the operators move towards regions with a 
reasonable number of farms that demand the service. Thus the revenue generated by the number of 
operations performed is higher than the cost of transportation, which means that the availability of the service 
is not influenced by the location of the coffee crop itself. 
About Hypothesis 2 (H2), it is noted that the variable PRES_TAC (p <0.01) negatively affects 
outsourcing contracts and favors vertical integration. While the variable OTHER_CONTRACTS (P <0.1) directs 
the decision to outsourcing contract. Both results occurred as expected. The first one is that there is higher 
uncertainty in the regions where the Public Prosecutor's Office already banned, at least once, the outsourcing 
of mechanization through the TAC, which implies the vertical integration of the transaction. And the second 
result shows that the lower uncertainty of the competence to deal with contractual management (eg, conflict 
resolution, negotiability) implies in outsourcing contracts. 
The variable EXIST_LAWSUIT of H2 appeared with an opposite sign to the expected and not 
significant. The possible justification is given by the fact that the existence of labor problems in the coffee 
culture has been frequent for many years. Coffee producers are aware of the institutional environment's action 
on this topic. The conflicts over processes to guarantee workers' rights have started from the beginning of 
coffee production in Brazil. Therefore, frequent contact with labor rights issues of employees makes this 
uncertainty less relevant to the transaction. 
About Hypothesis 3 (H3), the finding of the FAM_TRADITION variable (p <0.01) confirms the family 
tradition as relevant. Involvement in crop production across generations carries the aspect of path dependence 
in decision making. This factor influences the use of the machines themselves as expected. 
However, the FARMER_EXPERIENCE variable appeared with the expected signal, but not significant. 
Possibly, this result means that path dependence requires a long period of time to be built, as well as it 
suggests that the intrinsic conservatism in the tradition in the activity can also only be constructed in the long 
term, because the time of an individual is not sufficient. 
All control variables obtained significance in the model: EDUCATION (p <0.001), HECTARES (p 
<0.001), WORKFORCE_STRUCTURE (p <0.01) and PERC_GOURMET (p <0.1). 
The variable EDUCATION showed that the increase in the level of education positively influences the 
outsourcing of mechanization, because the contractual management will be stronger and the capacity of the 
producer to deal with the arrangement is potentialized, so the tradition deriving from the path dependence 
might be minimized. 
The variable HECTARES appeared as expected. The expectation on this metric was the negative 
influence in the outsourcing, because the larger the coffee crop, the higher the possibility of dilution of fixed 
costs of capital due to the scale of the operation. The larger coffee grower will tend to use his own machinery 
for the cost-benefit ratio. The need to provide a service in a coffee crop in larger areas raises the costs, as there 
will be a need to contract more hours of service. 
The WORKFORCE_STRUCTURE variable had its result different than expected. The scale of the 
variable around labor (WORKFORCE_STRUCTURE) should positively affect outsourcing, because the structure of 
labor adopted in a farmer tending to manual would have to make greater investments to adopt mechanization 
through its own machineries. However, the result of negative correlation with outsourcing suggests that the 
obstacle is not a high capital investment, but rather the impossibility of mechanization, that is, the coffee 
grower in hilly and rugged regions is unable to adopt mechanization, because this topography might restrict the 
entry of large machineries, as in the case of some regions of the South of Minas Gerais that only adopt manual 
harvesting. 
The variable PERC_GOURMET appeared as expected. The expectation on this metric was the 
negative influence in the outsourcing. This result led to the fact that the coffee grower is meticulous in the 
harvesting process aiming to obtain better quality in his fruits, that is, he has to do the activity with caution 
(e.g. exact regulation in the machinery). 
5. Final Remarks 
The objective of analyzing the mechanization outsourcing of the harvest in coffee crop was reached 
in conjunction with the exposure of its determinants. Theoretically, it was obtained the empirical proof and 
validation of the hypotheses of asset specificity and uncertainty of the efficient alignment of the theory of the 
Transaction Costs Economics, as well as the validation of path dependence. 
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About business and management applications some strategic points were obtained for the coffee 
grower and for the firms providing the service. It was observed that the characteristics that counteracted 
outsourcing contracts were: the need for driver's experience, the investments in specific machineries for coffee 
harvesting, the producer's perception of loss of value due to delayed harvesting, existence of TAC, farmer’s 
family tradition in coffee production, farmer size (number of hectares of coffee), capability to produce high 
quality coffee. While the determinants of subcontracting were: high education level and the adoption of 
contracts as a way of coordinating other transactions. 
The findings of this study showed that the producer of this activity is able to use the harvesting 
mechanization through three scenarios: exclusive use by own machineries, exclusive use of outsourcing 
contracts or use of both - own machineries and outsourcing contracts. The decision of which scenario to adopt 
depends on the characteristics of each farm. It is possible to affirm that the transaction of harvesting 
mechanization of the coffee farmer has changed and probably continues to change constantly. The generalist 
view of the conservative farmer might be taken as extinct, because several agents are able to use outsourcing 
contracts and other coordination mechanisms offered by the sector. 
The main managerial and public policy contribution is that the outsourcing of agricultural 
mechanization should be seen as a legal institutional arrangement, not a coordination form that aims to 
precarious work. Specifically, attention is drawn to political interference in outsourcing decisions, which may 
limit the choice of the productive agent and affect his economic performance. Thus, the efforts of political 
decision-makers should be directed to the normalization of monitoring mechanisms and control of the 
employment of the work as a whole, whether outsourced or not, because the worker will continue to work, but 
with a different boss. 
The results can be extended to other countries and other crops with a careful generalization in order 
to help the agents of the institutional environment in the creation of regulations for the legislation still in 
closing, aiming at the reduction of potential conflicts. Indeed, the study highlights similar points able to 
generalize the results in the transaction of harvesting mechanization, for example, the influence of 
specialization of human capital in rural decisions as mentioned by Fisher and Knutson (2013) in the U.S. 
agriculture, the amount of investments in specialized assets in rural farms in China (Yang et. al., 2013) and 
Netherlands and Japan (Igata, Hendriksen & Heijamn (2008),  the concerning with time in agricultural 
production in Ghana (Hossou et. al., 2013), the interference of the tradition on past decisions in Spain (Navarro, 
2002). 
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